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POSITIVISM, EMERGENT
AND TRIUMPHANT

Vincent A. Wellman*

By Anthony
Sebok. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 327.
$59.95.

LEGAL PosITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE.

"Positivism" is one of those words that triggers passionate and
often contradictory responses. For some, positivism is a pejorative.1
Lon Fuller, perhaps more than anyone, charged that positivism was
confused about the nature of law, blind to law's inherent morality,
and morally corrupting to boot.2 He even suggested, in different
ways, that positivism helped promote the rise of fascism in Europe.3
Others, in contrast, have treated positivism as a modest and
undeniable truth about law. Law, they argued, is morally fallible,
and accordingly, the existence and validity of law is a matter of so
cial fact rather than moral necessity. H.L.A. Hart, in particular, of
fered this perspective.4 Building on the arguments of Austin and
Bentham, his British predecessors, he characterized positivism in
ways that took it less as a theory of law by itself than as a starting
point for developing a satisfactory theory.5 Attributing to positiv* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School; J.D. 1980, Yale Law School.
- Ed.
1. This fact about the history of positivism's "reputation" was examined recently in
Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: EssAYS ON LEGAL
PosmvxsM 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter AUTONOMY].
2. Fuller developed these criticisms in a number of writings, over a series of years. See,
e.g., LoN L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law
A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law].
3. See, e.g., Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra note 2.
4. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv.
593, 599 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism]. What both Austin and Bentham were anxious
to assert were the following two simple things: first, in the absence of an expressed constitu·
tional or legal provision, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards
of morality that it was not a rule of law; and conversely, it could not follow from the mere
fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of law.
It is useful, in this connection, to observe that in building his own affirmative theory of the
nature of law and adjudication, Hart delayed discussing the natural law-legal positivism di
vide until after he had laid the foundations of his claim that law is a system of rules. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1st ed. 1961); see also id. at 6-13. This indi
cates, along with other facets of his book, that Hart saw the separability thesis as independent
of questions about the nature of legal systems.
5. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 4, at 601 n.25 (distinguishing five different ideas attrib
uted to positivism and arguing that only some were held by Austin and Bentham).
-
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ism anything more substantial than this, Hart suggested, would risk
both misperceptions about law's nature and also confusions about
our political and legal obligations.6

In terms that are important for appreciating Anthony Sebok's7
enterprise, those who have followed Hart's lead take positivism to
offer only a "thin" theory.8 That is, positivism involves little more
than the apparently simple claim that there is no necessary or logi
cal connection between law and morality.9 This claim, now
standardly called the separability thesis, 10 does not by itself entail
any particular position about the nature of law or about the nature
of judicial decisionmaking.11 Theories about those topics need to
be developed, on this approach to positivism, in order to complete
our understanding of the nature of law; the separability thesis
means only that it cannot be a precondition for the adequacy of
such theories that law, or legal rules, must always be moral. Fuller's
denigration of positivism, on the other hand, assumed that positiv
ism is a "thick" theory, entailing deep but profoundly mistaken
views about the nature of law and adjudication and the fundamen
tal morality of both.12 This thick theory of positivism should be
rejected, Fuller maintained, because its concomiiant positions on
the nature of law and adjudication are both wrong and pernicious.
Anthony Sebok rejects both these perspectives, at least as re
gards positivism as it has been found in American legal theory of
the last century. Fuller was wrong, Sebok maintains (pp. 46-47,
160-69), because he conflated positivism's core tenets with some of
the mistaken ideas of Austin and Hobbes. But, ' Sebok argues (pp.
18-19), positivism is thicker than H.L.A. Hart's successors have
acknowledged. Properly understood, it involves a complex set of
commitments, especially as concerns the nature of judicial decision
making. Thus, Sebok's argument proceeds on two levels. One
involves an argument (pp. 6, 18-19, 267-317) for what is now called
incorporationism, or sometimes inclusivist positivism.13 This is an
6. See id. at 606-15 (rejecting the argument that positivism requires a formalist theory of
adjudication); id. at 615-21 (discussing post-Nazi cases involving "grudge informers" who·
were punished retroactively).
7. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School
8. See, e.g., pp. 18-19. AJ;, Sebok notes, these descriptors were first used by Kent
Greenawalt See p. 19 n.41 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing
Features of Legal Positivism, in AUTONOMY, supra note 1, at 1).
9. This claim is far less simple than meets the eye. See David Lyons, Moral Aspects of
Legal Theory, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 223, 245 (Peter A. French et al. eds.,
1982).
10. See, e.g., p. 30.
11. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
12. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra note 2, passim
13. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in AUTONOMY, supra note 1, at 287,
287-88.
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inquiry in philosophy of law, advancing incorporationism as against
both natural law and also a competing brand of positivism that is
usually termed exclusivism, or nonincorporationism. At the other
level, Sebok is developing a thesis of intellectual history, interpret
ing the twists and turns of twentieth-century American jurispru
dence in ways that are fresh and challenging. His focus at this
second level is also called "positivism," but in this context what he
means is better understood as a theory of adjudication rather than a
claim about philosophy of law. In particular, Sebok aims to rehabil
itate the theory of adjudication which was propounded by Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks in their influential manuscript from the
1950s, The Legal Process. 14 As Sebok views it, Hart and Sacks's
theory is underappreciated today because, soon after it emerged, it
was usurped by conservative critics of the Warren Court, who used
it to advance a political agenda that is alien to the Legal Process
theory of adjudication.ts
What links these two levels of argument is a claim about the
goals, and virtues, of positivism: positivist theories, according to
Sebok, seek to develop a theory of law that both accommodates
and controls judicial discretion.16 The contribution of Hart and
Sacks to this project is to offer a theory of adjudication that incor
porates principles (some of them moral) as part of a complex mech
anism for controlling judicial discretion. The contribution of
incorporationism is to show that it is possible, consistent with legal
positivism's basic tenets, to include moral principles in a theory of
adjudication without falling into some kind of natural law position.
The result is a rich and complex exploration of the development, in
twentieth-century American legal theory, of the theory (or theo
ries) called positivism. By my lights, Sebok is more successful in his
argument about intellectual history and especially the hijacking of
Hart and Sacks, than in his argument to connect these develop
ments with the incorporationism debate in philosophy of law. But,
at every level, this is an admirable piece of work, rich in detail and
elegant in its design. Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence is
a book that I will long remember and draw from in my own think
ing about these issues.

14. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) [hereinafter TLP].

15. See pp. 179-216 ("The False Choice Between the Warren Court and Legal Process").
16. P. 17 ("[L]egal positivism tries to understand law as a system of variably constrained
discretion. The positivist recognizes that the law sometimes requires the judge to exercise
significant amounts of discretion but distinguishes judicial discretion from sovereign power
by tethering the delegation of judicial discretion to the law itself.").
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OF lNCORPORATIONISM

It is useful to begin with the argument about positivism's philo
sophical commitments, although I regard this as the less impressive
part of Sebok's enterprise. For some time, philosophy of law has
tended to regard natural law and legal positivism as opposed and
incompatible philosophical approaches to law.17 Along these lines,
many positivists distinguish their approach from that of natural law
by reference to the separability thesis: to accept that thesis means
that positivism denies, but natural law affirms , that there is some
necessary, or logical, connection between law and morality. Positiv
ism, on this formulation, allows that some (even most) legal systems
might exhibit a connection with morality, because of some fact of,
say, the history of those legal systems or perhaps of their particular
constitution. But law and morality are still importantly distinct, so
that there could well be laws or legal systems, properly so called,
which are morally deficient.
While the core idea of the separability thesis can be found in
H.L.A. Hart's seminal 1958 essay, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 18 both the term "separability thesis" and the
idea's centrality to positivism owe to Jules Coleman's important es
say in 1982, Negative and Positive Positivism.19 Coleman's under
standing of positivism allows that moral principles might be part of
the law of some legal system, and it is this version of positivism that
Sebok aims to defend. The alternative view, based on the views of
Joseph Raz, rejects the idea that moral principles can be properly
p art of the legal system and hence is called "non
incorporationism," or "exclusivism."20 On Raz's view, moral prin
ciples can be factors in certain judicial decisions but not part of the
law.
The status of moral principles has been a recurring problem for
positivism. The most forceful and elegant arguments about such
principles have been advanced by Ronald Dworkin in a series of
essays challenging positivism.21 When deciding "hard" cases,
17. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 242 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996)
("[P]ositivists and natural lawyers are treated as a contrasting pair.'1).
18. Hart, Positivism, supra note 4.
19. Coleman, supra note 10.
20. As Sebok observes, Frederick Schauer has also advanced a nonincorporationist
version of positivism which he has termed "presumptive positivism.'' See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARVARD J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 645, 678-79 {1991).
Sebok discusses Schauer's arguments, see, e.g., pp. 277-87, but since the crux of Sebok's argu
ment has to do with the role of legal principles, and since Sebok himself views Schauer's
argument on this point as parallel to Raz's, see p. 280, it is Raz's version of non
incorporationism which poses the most important challenge.
21. Three of Dworkin's essays are particularly important in this regard. See RONALD
DwoRKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING Rrmrrs SERIOUSLY, supra, at 81; Ronald A. Dworkin,
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argued Dworkin, judges characteristically make use of norms that
appear both to be legal, in some important sense, and also to have
significant moral content.22 Dworkin, for example, has made much
of the case of Riggs v. Palmer,23 in which the New York Court of
Appeals upheld a challenge to an otherwise valid will on the
grounds that the will's main beneficiary had murdered the testator
to prevent him from changing the will. In its decision, the court
relied on what it called a "maxim" of the common law, "no one
shall be permitted . . . to take advantage of his own wrong,"24 as
grounds for allowing the challenge to the murderer's claim. What
the court called a maxim, Dworkin called a principle, but his funda
mental claim was of course substantive rather than terminological.
The law, he argued, is well-stocked with such principles, and while
they express fundamental moral claims, they are also an important
component of the reasoning by judges in cases that establish rights
and liabilities.25 Thus, on the one hand they are moral principles
and yet on the other hand they also appear to be legal - they are
principles of law, in some nontrivial sense of that word. Thus,
Dworkin argued, such principles challenge positivism, at least as
along the lines suggested by Austin and H.L.A. Hart.

In responding to this challenge, positivists have split into two
camps, each camp offering a different solution to the problem of
principles. The exclusivist position owes principally, as I have said,
to Joseph Raz. On Raz's view, while moral principles can play an
important role in judicial decisions, they do not really become part
of the legal system. Their role, as Raz sees it, is that of an outsider,
an alien presence. Principles are used or borrowed by the deciding
court, just as a Michigan court would use or borrow the law of Cali
fornia in order to decide a controversy where the applicable "con
flicts" rules of decision conclude that the dispute is governed by the
law of California:
Suppose that the law requires that unregulated disputes (i.e. those
with respect to which the law is unsettled) be determined on the basis
of moral considerations (or a certain subclass of them, such as consid
erations of justice or moral considerations not fundamentally at odds
with social morality). . . . To conform to [exclusivism] we will have to
say that while the rule referring to morality is indeed law (it is deter
mined by its sources) the morality to which it refers is not thereby
"Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165 (1982); RoNALD DwoRKIN, The Model of
Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (rev. ed. 1978).
22. See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 22-23.
23. See id. at 23 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889)).
24. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190, quoted in DWORKIN, The Model ofRules I, supra note 21, at 23.
25. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 22, 28-31; see also
Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 21 at 90-94, 105-23; Dworkin "Natural" Law Revisited,
supra note 21, at 165-66, 169-73.
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incorporated into law. The rule is analogous to a 'conflict of law' rule
imposing a duty to apply a foreign system which remains independent
of and outside the municipal law.26
So, properly regarded, such principles are no challenge at all.
It is important to observe that Raz's exclusion of principles is
not motivated by his adherence to the separability thesis. His
approach to positivism goes so far as to relegate that thesis to a
secondary importance; indeed, at times he seems to abandon it alto
gether.21 Instead, Raz argues that positivism's central commitment
is to something he calls the sources thesis, which holds "that the
existence and content of every law is fully determined by social
sources."28 The "sources" of a law are "those facts by virtue of
which it is valid and which identify its content,"29 and Raz contends
that it is a constraint on the adequacy of any theory of law that its
test for validity and identification of law depend "exclusively on
facts of human behaviour capable of being described in value
neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument. "30
Moral principles, he holds, cannot meet that requirement.31
In contrast, the incorporationist approach to positivism accepts
moral principles as properly legal, at least in those instances where
the moral principle has been "incorporated" by some affirmative
legal act, practice, or provision. So, for example, the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution may require judges to reason morally
about the actions of the state, but it is not the morality of that
clause or of the attendant judicial decisions that make it law;
instead, what makes the Clause law is just the fact that it is part of
the Constitution. 32 Thus, argue the incorporationists, it is the fact
that the Clause was included in the Constitution that determines its
legal validity, not its moral truth or falsity. This means that law, in
any particular jurisdiction, could be moral or not, depending on the
facts of that jurisdiction's law - namely, what has or has not been
incorporated. Thus, for example, the same reasons that make the
Due Process Clause legally valid would also bear on the legal valid
ity, before the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, of Article
26. JosEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law,
37, 45-46 (Oxford University Press, 1979) (footnote omitted).

in THE AurHoRITY OF LAW

27. See id. at 38-39 (stating that the social thesis leaves open the question "whether or not
those social facts by which we identify the law or determine its existence do or do not endow
it with moral merit If they do, it bas of necessity a moral character"). As I argue later, one
crucial, but unappreciated question in the debate about the separability thesis is whether
law's putative connection with morality holds for each individual law, for the legal system as
a whole or only for certain essential processes of law. See infra text accompanying note 66.

supra note 26, at 46.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
See Hart, Positivism, supra note 4,

28. Raz,
29.
30.
31.
32.

at 599; Coleman, supra note 13, at 295.
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IV's morally repugnant Fugitive Slave Clause and Article I's infa
mous provision that counted slaves as only three-fifths of a person.
In sum, where an exclusivist holds that moral principles cannot
properly be regarded as part of law, an incorporationist can accept
such principles as properly legal. As Raz observes, incorporation
ism is compatible with the prospect that the identification of some
laws will tum on moral argument, but exclusivism rejects that pos
sibility.33 Moreover, behind this specific issue lies a larger question
about the core nature of legal positivism. Incorporationism identi
fies the separability thesis as positivism's central claim, but exclusiv
ism treats the sources thesis as its foundation instead.34
It should be clear from the earlier discussion why incorporation
ism is so vital to Sebok. The Legal Process theory of adjudication,
much like Dworkin's,35 countenances the prospect that moral prin
ciples might be part of the law and not merely sources of law: deci
sions made according to such principles can, in the appropriate
circumstances, be regarded as genuinely legal decisions, and the
conclusions derived therefrom can be regarded as valid legal rul
ings. So, if moral principles may be part of our law, then Sebok
needs incorporationism to preserve the claim that the Legal Process
school continued and extended the twentieth century legacy of
positivism.
Sebok's argument on this issue is, not surprisingly, an expansion
of Coleman's approach. To appreciate this position requires that
we understand, at least in its basics, the nonincorporationist
response. Raz is of course perfectly aware of salient instances, like
the Due Process Clause, where legal systems appear to have incor
porated moral norms. Why then would he advocate instead this
rather byzantine idea whereby moral norms are only referred to by
the law and not included in it? As Raz sees it, including moral prin
ciples as part of the law would undermine various of the functions
that legal systems should perform. The chief problem with moral
principles, in the exclusivist's view, seems to be the inherently con
troversial nature of such principles. Because moral issues are so
controversial, judges will not be seen as basing their decisions on
something "objective." Judicial decisions based on such controver
sial principles will not be perceived as both settled and
independent and hence will not fulfill their function of settling dis
putes. Moreover, morality seems to be "insatiable" in that it seems
33.

See RAz, Legal Positivism, supra note 26, at 47.
e.g., Coleman, supra note 13, at 287 with RAz, Legal Positivism, supra note

34. Compare,
26, at 41.

35. I have argued elsewhere that Dworkin's theory of adjudication, at least as expressed
in his early writings, is much the same as Hart and Sacks's. See Vmcent A. Wellman,
Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy ofHart & Sacks, 29 Aruz. L. REv. 413
(1987).
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difficult to incorporate a moral principle into a system of reasoning
without including all of morality. If so, then judicial decisions based
on moral principles threaten any sense of the autonomy of law: law
can no longer be expected to serve as a distinct realm of decision
making, it must instead be continuous with moral reasoning more
generally. Judges, as a result, are no longer officials of the legal
system with limited powers, but rather all-encompassing moral
arbiters.
Following Coleman, Sebok argues that the criteria for judicial
decisionmaking are all subject to the rule of recognition: the
organizing precept that, in any given legal system, validates the
rules which legal officials will treat as binding. The rule of recogni
tion, Coleman contends, is a matter of convergent social behavior
by the legal system's officials, including its judges.36 This means, as
Sebok describes it, that one legal system's rule of recognition could
both include moral principles and recognize what Sebok calls "in
terpretation rules" as part of its law (pp. 307-12). Glossing over the
intricacies, the basic point is that these interpretation rules can con
strain the way judges in a given legal system apply moral principles
or balance them off against other values of the legal system. Moral
ity, as used in legal decisionmaking, is not necessarily insatiable, nor
controversial beyond the capacity of law to settle legal disputes.
And so, incorporationism is sustained.
While I am generally sympathetic to incorporationism, I am
unsatisfied by this answer. In the first place, it seems to miss the
point of incorporationism, because it ultimately denies the morality
of moral principles. This issue raises deep questions about the
nature of morality, but the idea of a moral principle seems to re
quire that the consequences of a principle, taken by itself, must
themselves be moral. That is, if I claim to be applying a moral prin
ciple (and if no other principles or values are in play) then my an
swer must, at a minimum, be morally acceptable; conversely, if the
conclusions I draw from a given moral principle are not morally
acceptable, then I am applying something other than the principle I
claim to employ. But Sebok's interpretation rules violate this
requirement.
[F]aimess does not have an a priori legal meaning, even if it does
have a determinate but contested meaning to the Rawlsian and the
utilitarian. [H.L.A.] Hart argued that under the English and
American legal systems the rule of interpretation concerning legisla
tive supremacy often directs a judge to identify a legal fact notwith
standing the judge's own convictions. We should assume that there
are rules of interpretation concerning moral values that also direct a
judge to identify the "legal" meaning of words like fairness, notwith36.

See Coleman, supra note

13, at 289-96.
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standing the judge's conviction of what fairness really means, all
things considered. [p. 307]
As I read this argument, what's doing the work is the idea that the
legal meaning of a particular norm can be different from the norm's
meaning outside the particular legal system. Put differently, it is the
legal system's rule of recognition which, by use of the rules of inter
pretation, will determine the application of the moral norm. But, if
the moral norm's application in a given legal system is determined
by something other than valid moral reasoning (assuming still that
the only norm at issue is the moral principle) then the norm is no
longer a moral norm. In sum, Sebok's solution seems ultimately to
become a kind of nonincorporationist response, because ultimately
there are no moral principles at work, only legal ones.
I'm also troubled by this argument because it seems unnecessary
for Sebok's overall project. As was noted earlier,37 Sebok's argu
ment about twentieth-century American legal theory depends cru
cially on the theory of adjudication that was advanced by Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks, because their theory countenances princi
ples as part of the law to be applied by judges in important legal
decisions. The picture of law advanced by Hart and Sacks is one in
which there are various values at work in the legal system - some
of them perhaps moral and others likely not. Adjudication, at least
in common law systems like our own, may require the application
of these values, but it misreads the Legal Process theory to think
that only one such value will be relevant or applicable to a contro
versial decision. To the contrary, important cases may require
judges to weigh competing values - principles against policies and
against other principles.38 But, if adjudication can involve the
weighing of competing principles, or more generally of competing
values, then I see no reason why this feature of judicial decision
making should be different if some, but not all, of the legal system's
values are moral. In any given case, where multiple and competing
values bear on a particular decision, the court may decide to
advance one value, because of the balance of reasons, but the value
advanced need not be the moral one. The resulting model of judi37. See supra text accompanying note 16.
38. Dworkin's view of principles and policies reflects this feature of adjudication: princi
ples are logically different from rules, he argues, because principles have a "dimension of
weight or importance. When principles intersect {the policy of protecting automobile con
sumers intersecting with principles of freedom of contract, for example), one who must
resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of each." DwoRKIN, The
Model ofRules I, supra note 21, at 26. The logical difference between rules and principles, as
Dworkin describes it, has a further consequence as well. The fact that a given principle
applies to a controversy does not require that the judicial decision must adhere to that princi
ple. "We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong,
but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit from wrongs he commits." Id.
at 25. As a result, a principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not
necessitate a particular decision." Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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cial decisionmaking will, of course, produce results which are not
moral, but for a positivist that is just as is to be expected: positivism
does not require that the set of legal decisions be moral. So,
incorporationism can be cavalier about including moral principles
in the law, or even in the rule of recognition, so long as there are
other values at work as well, nonmoral but nonetheless weighty.39
I have made the point in terms of common law reasoning, which
involves reasoning from valid rules and norms rather than reason
ing from the rule of recognition to identify or validate rules or
norms. But, by hypothesis, the incorporationist accepts that the
rule of recognition can include values amongst its provisions
if
not, moral validity would pose no issue for the incorporationist
theory. So, if the rule of recognition can include moral values, it
can include others as well and, the incorporationist may argue,
could require that nonmoral values sometimes count more than
moral ones in the identification as well as in the application of law.
Incorporationism, in other words, is not threatened by insatiability,
so long as the Legal Process theory of adjudication can be
sustained.
-

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY
Sebok's argument about the intellectual history of positivism is
almost dialectical in its structure, although he does not invoke that
concept or its terminology.40 As he views it, American legal theory
39. Sebok's discussion of this point is considerably more involved than I have, or possibly
could have, presented in this review. Its central feature depends on an argument about what
he terms the "insatiability" of moral reasoning, a point that he employs both in his discussion
of incorporationism, pp. 294-307, and also in his argument about certain versions of constitu
tional interpretation that see the Supreme Court as advancing "fundamental rights." See pp.
259-66; see also infra note 64. The issue is complex, but my disagreement with Sebok on the
nature of adjudication springs, in part, from my rejection of his insatiability argument.
Stripped to its essentials, Sebok's argument is this: any normative system with an insatiable
concept - like that of justice - will become a monistic system of practical reasoning, in
which all decisions will be measured against that insatiable concept. See pp. 260-64. Monism,
as he means it, "assumes not only that the choices one makes can be ranked but also that
one's reasons are comparable along a common metric." P. 262. Now, it seems plain to me
that whatever may be the case for constitutional interpretation, the common law as we know
it defies easy categorization along these lines - sometimes appearing monistic and some
times not. But the real point goes to insatiability: insatiability of the sort that bothers Sebok
requires monism, rather than producing it. As a consequence, we can understand how legal
systems can block insatiability: any system of law which is not independently committed to
producing the morally right answer in every controversy can be comfortable advancing other
values as well as morality. Thus, legal reasoning does not necessarily respect the insatiability
of moral norms like justice or fairness. To the contrary, a given legal system can instead
advance other values, sometimes at the expense of justice or fairness or the like.

40. The following description of the structure of Sebok's argument is, of course, an utter
bowdlerization of Hegel's complex and arcane argument for the phenomenological develop
ment of "spirit." Hegel's view, in all its intricacy and obscurity, can be found in G.W.F.
HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (J.B. Baillie trans. 1967).
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of the past hundred or so years has involved the struggle of an idea
- legal positivism - to express itself. It was initially expressed,
albeit incompletely, at the end of the nineteenth century by writers
who were influenced by Austin. Then, the idea confronted another
opposing idea, and in reaction to that opposition was ultimately
transformed into something different (and better) than its earlier
manifestation. Then, having been transformed, positivism again
confronted an opposite idea and again overcame it through yet
another transformation. This second dynamic of thesis and antithe
sis, followed by synthesis, begins with the Legal Process school and
the "reasoned elaborationists" of the 1950s, and leads us through
the twists and turns both of conservative critics like Herbert Wechs
ler and Robert Bork, and of natural law theorists like David Rich
ards and Ronald Dworkin, until we arrive at the current moment in
intellectual history.41
A.

The first phase of this story involves the familiar topics of for
malism and American Legal Realism, but Sebok's examination of
these ideas yields some surprising conclusions. In the beginning, he
contends, positivism was brought to the American legal experience
through the influence of the scholars who are now so often deni
grated as formalists. 42 Upon closer analysis, these writers - most
saliently, Christopher Langdell (pp. 83-97) and Joseph Beale (pp.
97-104) - turn out to be positivists in their views about the nature
of law and what makes it authoritative. But the formalists were
hamstrung by a woefully inadequate theory of adjudication; this
early version of positivism could not conceive of a mechanism by
which to control judicial discretion and so it espoused instead a
vision of law that left judges little discretion to reconsider the rules
of law they sought to apply. Because their theory of adjudication
41. Indeed, Sebok's own characterization of the debate between incorporationism and its
critics is couched in much the same terms. The triumph of incorporationism, which he calls
the "New Positivism," also involves three stages:
Frrst, there was the "founding," which took place . . . through the publication of H.L.A.
Hart's The Concept ofLaw. Hart set out the essential principles of the New Positivism,
and much of the conflict among subsequent New Positivists has been over the proper
interpretation of his legacy. The second stage was the critique of Hart's positivism by
Dworkin. Dworkin was a critical player . . . because his restatement of Hart's theory for no other purpose than to criticize it - has been very influential among Hart's later
defenders. The final stage, which began in the early 1970s and is still unfolding, involves
efforts by New Positivists to answer Dworkin and refine Hart's work.
P. 268.
42. "Formalism" is, of course, another of those words that is commonly used as a pejora
tive, to the point where many have wondered if there is any real content to the term, or any
real reference. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 15-16 ("[A]ll
specimens (of mechanical jurisprudents that have been] captured - even Blackstone and
Joseph Beale - have had to be released after careful reading of their texts."). Sebok pro
vides a long discussion of the different strands of criticism of formalism. See pp. 48-60.
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was so unsatisfactory, the formalists were belittled first by Holmes
(pp. 60-75), then Pound (pp. 32-39), and then the Realists (pp. 7583, 104-12). The Realists themselves faced criticism by writers sueh
as Lon Fuller who were appalled by Nazi Germany's corruption of
law into an instrument for tyranny and oppression. Fuller held no
brief for the Realists, but he joined with them in scorning the ear
lier formalists.43 As a result, reviled by both the Realists and their
successors, positivism (in its formalist guise) fell into disrepute.
Before reading Sebok, I had largely supposed that the formalists
were unthinking adherents of a kind of simpleminded natural law
position. I had supposed this because I had also assumed that
American Legal Realism was dominated by Holmes' view of the
nature of law: since Holmes espoused a version of the separability
thesis,44 I therefore assumed that Holmes should be read as a posi
tivist, and hence, so should the Realists who, following in his foot
steps, criticized the formalists on many of the same grounds. As a
result, when it came to assessing formalism, I was inclined to con
trast the formalists with what I assumed to be the positivism of their
most vocal critics and accordingly to infer that the formalists must
be aligned with natural law. My easy and unreflective path through
these issues was no doubt aided by my uncritical adoption of Grant
Gilmore's famous characterization of Langdell as rigid, doctrinaire,
and essentially stupid.45 Sebok's close and careful examination of
both Holmes and his formalist targets, Langdell and Beale, leads
me to reconsider each and every one of these views. Langdell, in
particular, is rehabilitated into an interesting and reflective thinker
about the nature of law (pp. 86-97) and not at all the shallow pedant
that I had supposed him to be.
At one level, Sebok's conclusions about these familiar topics are
surprising. But at another, they are intuitively satisfying. First and
foremost, Sebok's analysis of Holmes and Langdell reminds me that
these are complex figures, with complicated views that cannot easily
be reduced to adherence or rejection of a few basic propositions.
Consider, in this connection, the position of Holmes. It is true that
Holmes denied that law was conceptually connected with morality,
and this denial means that he was to that extent a positivist. But
Holmes's embrace of the separability thesis, according to Sebok,
had more to do with his skepticism about morality than with a well
thought-out position about the nature of law (p. 68). And, in every
other respect, Holmes rejected the core tenets of Austinian positiv43.

See Fuller, supra note 2.

44. See pp. 67-69 (discussing Holmes' acceptance of the separability thesis);
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1897).

O.W.

45. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 13-15, 106-07 (Ronald K.L. Collins
ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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ism (pp. 67-68). So, classifying Holmes as positivist is too facile
and, as a result, misleading, especially when it comes to thinking
about the views of his Realist successors.
Sebok characterizes positivism as resting on a tripod of funda
mental tenets which were first articulated by Austin and Bentham.
The first of these is the separability thesis (already noted): the claim
"that there is no necessary connection between law and [morality]"
(p. 30). Second is the command theory, Austin's (and to some
extent Bentham's) argument that all laws are, at bottom, the com
mand of the sovereign (p. 31). Later positivists, such as Kelsen and
H.L.A. Hart, rejected the particular details of this theory. But,
their respective theories of the nature of law - requiring, in Kel
sen's case, a Grundnorm, that both identified the particular norms
of a legal system and engendered their validity,46 and, in Hart's
case, a rule of recognition that both identified and validated the
legal system's other rules47 - can be seen to "depersonalize" the
command theory. In effect, Kelsen and Hart analyzed law as deriv
able not from a distinct person of overweening power but instead
from an organizing precept which could play a comparable role in
establishing and maintaining a system of law. Finally, there is what
Sebok calls the sources thesis (pp. 31-32). In point of fact, Sebok's
version of this particular idea differs importantly from Raz's and
would be more usefully termed the "social" thesis.48 The core idea,
as Sebok develops it, is that each rule (or norm) of law must be
traceable to some identifiable social source (pp. 31-32, 106-07, 159).
In Austin's theory, that source was the will of the determinate sov
ereign and the social fact that the sovereign was owed a habit of
obedience by the bulk of the populace, 49 but in Hart's version of
positivism, the relevant social fact would be the acceptance of the
rule of recognition by the officials of the legal system.50
Viewing the formalists and their realist critics through this
three-part analysis,51 Sebok concludes that the formalists were the
46. See, e.g., HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STA1E 110-24 and passim.
47. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 4, at 91-93, 95-107.
48. See infra note 51. The distinction between the sources thesis and the social thesis
derives from Raz's work. See Raz, supra note 26.
49. See JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JurusPRUDENCE DETERMINED 6-20, 199-212
(1984).
50. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 4, at 111-14.
51. There is a deeper difficulty with Sebok's argument on this point - just who should
and should not count as a positivist. In his eyes, both the formalists and later the Legal
Process school were positivists because, in each case, they accepted positivism's three key
tenets - the separability thesis, the command theory (or its modem-day counterpart) and
the sources thesis. But, this argument papers over a deep and unresolved tension amongst
these tenets, as least as understood by the main disputants. Coleman, for example, under
stands positivism to involve the separability thesis and the rule of recognition (H.L.A. Hart's
counterpart to the command theory), but he rejects the sources thesis, at least as Raz has
advanced it. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 305-08. Raz, on the other hand, understands

May 1999]

Positivism

1735

adherents of positivism, although misguided in their picture of adju
dication (pp. 104-11). Through a careful analysis of the writings of
Langdell, for example, he argues that Langdell accepted each leg of
this tripod (pp. 83-97). Holmes, on the other hand, embraced only
the separability thesis, and identifying him as a positivist is accord
ingly inaccurate (pp. 67-68). Finally, the Realists, while often
unclear about many of their views, were led away from positivism
by their rejection of formalism's theory of adjudication; they em
braced none of positivism's core tenets and, at times, rejected some
of them outright. The criticisms levelled at the formalists varied
with their different critics but, in Sebok's eyes, the most insightful
of these critics was Lon Fuller, who scorned formalism just because
it rejected any enduring connection between law and morality (pp.
20-24). That is, Fuller recognized that formalism was based on
something like the separability thesis and rejected it for just that
reason. So, when Fuller began in the 1940s to espouse his distinct
version of natural law, hard on the heels of realism's crusade, he
both represented, in Sebok's view, the culmination of the earlier
criticisms of formalism (p. 20) and also confirmed the characteriza
tion of formalism as fundamentally positivistic (p. 42).
Second, Sebok has reminded me to be wary of accepting any
view of intellectual history that was propounded by those who were
on only one side of an important debate. Consider, in this connecpositivism to require the sources thesis, but abjures the separability thesis. In particular, Raz
acknowledges, positivism as he understands it is consistent with certain kinds of necessary
connections between law and morality. In terms of the point made earlier, the sources thesis
might lead to denying any necessary connection between morality and each rule of law, or
each judicial decision, but does not foreclose some deep connection between morality and
the legal system, taken as a whole.
Some part of the difficulty here is terminological. Raz developed his idea of the sources
thesis by building from a related, but less aggressive position that he termed the social thesis.
This he defined as being the claim "that what is law and what is not is a matter of social fact."
Raz, supra note 26, at 37. As Raz develops the argument, the social thesis has both strong
and weak versions, and the weak version is compatible with the claim, "[s]ometimes the
identification of some laws turns on moral arguments." Id. at 47. Moreover, the strong social
thesis, which Raz renames the sources thesis, excludes that statement. See id. In other words,
the weak social thesis is consistent with incorporationism, but the sources thesis is not. The
social thesis seems to be much closer to Sebok's version of the sources thesis, but the differ
ence is important. So, Sebok has clouded the picture by using Raz's crucial term in a manner
somewhat inconsistent with Raz's own development. But, the problem goes beyond mere
terminology. To make his argument that the formalists, for example, were misunderstood
advocates of positivism, Sebok needs an initial characterization of who is, and who is not,
properly to be understood as a positivist. And, in order to be illuminating, Sebok's initial
characterization of positivism needs to straddle the important dichotomy between
incorporationism and nonincorporationism - he would beg the question about who really
was a positivist if his test for positivism adopted only the incorporationist's definition, or the
nonincorporationist's. So, it makes sense that his initial characterization should include fea
tures of both camps, if those features can be used consistently together. See, e.g., Coleman &
Leiter, supra note 17. But the "sources" thesis is so intimately tied to Raz's version of
(nonincorporationist) positivism, and the separability thesis is now so tied to Coleman's alter
nate approach, that it is disquieting to see them amalgamated together, without an attending
acknowledgment.
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tion, the case of Lochner v. New York,52 often derided as the quin
tessential "formalist" opinion.53 There the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York law on the grounds that it violated a norm
of freedom of contract, which was assumed by the majority to be
enshrined in the Constitution. Descriptions of Lochner's formalism
have always seemed too pat to me, although I seldom paused to
wonder why. A common strand of criticism decries Lochner's for
malist majority as either knaves or fools. On the one hand, the
(knavish) majority is to be scorned because it decided the case as it
did on the basis of a conservative economic policy but "hid" the
"true" reasons for its decision. In other words, Lochner was wrong
because it was antiprogressive in its social policy, but the majority
lacked the courage of its convictions. On the other hand, the (fool
ish) majority is to be mocked because it supposedly believed, of
course wrongly, that it did not have any choice about its decision,
that it was duty-bound to apply the constitutional norm of freedom
of contract, notwithstanding the policy preferences of the people of
New York.
I am no fan of formalism, nor of Lochner, but this dual criticism
has always bothered me, for several reasons, not the least of which
is its self-contradictoriness: if the majority was foolish in its belief
that it could only advance the norms already enshrined in the
Constitution, then it could not also be knavish for hiding its view of
economic policy. Moreover, each branch of this criticism was itself
unsatisfying. For instance, how could the knavish majority have
thought to hide its true reasons when Holmes, in his ringing dissent
in the same case, so clearly revealed the supposedly "hidden" mis
sion of imposing on us Herbert Spenser's laissez-faire social philos
ophy?54 And, even more important, how can the majority's policy
preferences be held to be so wrong-headed unless we have a robust
theory of constitutional interpretation which establishes a constitu
tional mandate to further the opposing, progressive, policies?
What is perhaps most important for Sebok's overall argument is
the manner in which the Realists proceeded to oppose formalism,
because he contends that the Realist's campaign against positivism
presaged the later hijacking of positivism's second incarnation, the
Legal Process tradition. In the Realists' portrayal, positivism was
burdened, as Sebok phrases it, with excess "theoretical baggage" (p.
18). First, the Realists painted a misleading picture of Langdell and
Beale and accused them of promoting certain conservative values,
at the expense of an honest, and more "realistic" picture of law.
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9·64 (1995) (ar
ticulating different strands of realist criticism of Lochner).
54. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Tb.en, aided by Fuller, the Realists also conflated the formalists'
essential positivism with their mistaken theory of adjudication.
Thus portrayed as both conservative and obtuse, positivism lan
guished until two developments in the 1950s: H.L.A. Hart's 1958
essay (written after he had spent a year at the Harvard Law School,
debating some of these issues with Lon Fuller and Henry Hart), and
the emergence (also at the Harvard Law School) of the theory of
"reasoned elaborationism" and its theoretical underpinnings in
Hart and Sacks's manuscript.

B.
The second phase of positivism's emergence was brought about
by the Legal Process school of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. I
welcome Sebok's analysis because I have long been of the opinion
that the Legal Process school is a rich and insightful approach to the
problems of a theory of adjudication. In my view, the Legal Process
school is the dominant theory of adjudication in American law,
although Hart and Sacks are not often credited for their contribu
tions. Accordingly, I have been both baffled and frustrated by the
way in which they are so often dismissed as relics of a former epoch.
Sebok's analysis helps explain why.
In Sebok's telling of the story, Hart and Sacks provide what pos
itivism's early versions lacked: an adequate theory of adjudication.
Formalism was hamstrung by a need to see law as consisting pri
marily of rules; this meant that formalists could not easily explain
judicial decisions - so prominent in the common law but also
increasingly apparent in constitutional interpretation - where the
deciding court reasoned about which rule to adopt or ab.out how to
reshape an old rule to meet changes in the social or political cli
mate. Formalism's deficiencies on just this point made it an easy
target for its critics. Hart and Sacks provided a theory to rebut the
Realists' skepticism about judicial decisionmaking without falling
back into the errors of formalism.
The chief contribution of the Legal Process school is to under
stand that law can consist of more than just rules. More precisely,
Hart and Sacks saw that law, as we find it in our own legal system,
includes different and distinct elements. First, there are rules
(which are familiar enough) and, relatedly, what Hart and Sacks
call "standards," rule-like norms which make use of open-ended cri
teria like "reasonableness" or "due care." These norms operate, as
it were, on the surface of legal reasoning: we can observe that most
judicial decisions involve the identification of a rule or standard and
its application to the controversy at hand. But Hart and Sacks
observed that other types of norms are also at work in judicial

·
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decisionmaking: what they called "principles" and "policies."SS
The distinction between principles and policies can be elusive, but
what's salient is the idea that principles and policies are values that,
according to the Legal Process school, are part of the law.
Recognizing principles and policies as legal values accomplishes
two important things for the development of an adequate theory of
adjudication. First, in Sebok's terms, it accommodates judicial dis
cretion. Put differently, it means that valid legal decisions can be
other than mechanical: judges can, and will, shape their decisions
to further the values which are, on this theory, part of the law. In
cluding principles and policies in the body of law allows courts to
render creative decisions, in that judges may appropriately revisit
the legal system's norms, rethink the appropriateness of any partic
ular norm, and, in the appropriate case, legitimately craft new solu
tions to problems faced by the legal system. Indeed, including
principles and policies in our understanding of the law means that
in some cases, at least, judges are required to be creative: where
the previously acknowledged rule or standard no longer serves the
underlying values, the law (taken as a whole) requires the deciding
court to change the norm.
Second, such decisions are legally valid, because they are
instances of judges applying the law and not just advancing their
own personal policy choices. Hart and Sacks's picture of adjudica
tion embraces the idea that values (whether moral or other)S6 are
part of the law; what is equally important is the idea that these val
ues constrain judicial decisionmaking. "Underlying every rule and
standard . . . is at the least a policy and in most cases a principle.
This principle or policy is always available to guide judgment in
resolving uncertainties" about the meaning of the rule or stan
dard.57 Rules and standards are understood in this picture as based
on the legal system's values and as justified by those values. So,
when courts are called upon to assess any particular norm, they do
so in terms of the relevant principles and policies. If the court is
called upon to formulate a rule for inclusion in the legal system,
then the rule that should be formulated is the rule that best serves
the principles and policies of that area of the law. As a result,
including principles and policies means that such nonmechanical
decisions are nonetheless legally valid. Conversely, if the court is
called upon to examine a problematic rule, or to modify it, or to
55. See TLP, supra note 14, at 139-43.
56. Hart and Sacks do not argue, in anything like a systematic fashion, that the values
which are embodied in legal principles or policies are necessarily moral. But they seem to
countenance the possibility that some of their examples - like the principle that no one
should be unjustly enriched - either express or reflect the kinds of values that would
standardly be thought as moral.
57. TLP, supra note 14, at 148.
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replace it with a more appropriate norm, the court's examination
should address the question whether that norm is still justified by
the relevant values.
In sum, Hart and Sacks's theory of adjudication provides the
kind of solution that, according to Sebok, lies at the heart of positiv
ism: to accommodate and control judicial discretion. This conclu
sion, in turn, prompts the inevitable question: if, as Sebok and I
both believe, the Legal Process theory is so insightful and so deserv
ing of attention, why has it received so little recognition?
The answer is multifaceted, and fascinating. In the first place,
there is the strange history of the manuscript itself. Developed by
Hart and Sacks as a teaching vehicle across a span of several years,
it reached its final, but incomplete stage in their 1958 manuscript.
Thereafter, it was used by them at the Harvard Law School and by
professors at other law schools. But, it was never finished and
never published. For decades, it was only available as duplicated
pages from the Harvard Law School. Finally, after both Hart's and
Sacks's death, Bill Eskridge and Philip Frickey undertook to finish
and publish it. They published in 1994, but they did not finish. As
they explain in their Introduction, there was no way to revise the
manuscript, without attempting in effect to rewrite it from the
beginning. They decided instead to publish the manuscript as it
stood in the 1958 edition, together with their own substantial com
mentary on the manuscript's significance. Thus, Hart and Sacks's
crucial ideas were effectively diminished by the authors' long-term
inability to complete their project.
Hart and Sacks's ideas were minimized as well by the nature of
the authors' ambitions. Although the manuscript includes, early on,
a substantial essay entitled "Introductory Text Notes on the Nature
and Function of Law," Hart and Sacks clearly believed that their
approach to law could only be understood through the effort of
wrestling with various problems and conundra about the making
and application of law. As they wrote:

The technique of reasoned elaboration which courts pursue or ought
to pursue in the effort to arrive at decisions according to law defies
any facile generalization which will convey in itself a working under
standing. These materials seek mainly to arrive at such an under
standing by grappling with a series of concrete problems of decision
58

As a result, the reader is left to extract the most important insights
from discussions of particularly thorny cases, which are selected and
accompanied by text and questions which were both more designed
to be provocative than illuminating.
58. Id. at 146.
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To this unfortunate history, Sebok adds two further dimensions.
First, he argues that the impetus of the Legal Process school was
"usurped" by various conservative critics of the Supreme Court and
its activist posture in the 1950s and 1960s (p. 188). In the legal
world of the 1950s, the most salient event was, of course, not the
development of Hart and Sacks's ideas but the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.59 In 1959, shortly after
the last version of the Legal Process manuscript, Herbert Wechsler
gave his now famous lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu
tional Law, 6o at the same Harvard Law School. Wechsler was criti
cal of the Brown decision, ostensibly on the grounds that the
decision failed to articulate "neutral" principles which could serve
to validate judicial reasoning in other constitutional decisions. On
the surface, at least, Wechsler's argument resembled the kind of
perspective on judicial decisionmaking that Hart and Sacks were
attempting to express: it required that each decision be justified not
solely by reference to the rightness of its result, but by reference to
the craft and elegance of the judicial reasoning that led to the con
clusion. 61 This emphasis on the distinct requirements of profession
alism and valid reasoning echoed themes that Hart and Sacks had
each expressed in other writings about the activities of the Supreme
Court, in addition to their manuscript. As a result, in the minds of
many, Wechsler was either an adherent of the Legal Process school,
or at least a fellow traveler, and his criticism of Brown was taken as
an indication that the Court's activism in challenging racial discrim
ination was somehow contrary to the core of the Legal Process
school's theory of adjudication.62
Regardless of the surface similarities between Wechsler's view
and Hart and Sacks's, it was a striking non sequitur to associate the
neutral principles argument with the Legal Process theory of adju
dication. First and foremost, the Legal Process manuscript did not
attempt to develop a theory of constitutional adjudication.
Notwithstanding the exhaustive nature of their discussion of those
topics they undertook, they never took up constitutional law in any
systematic way. Second, the overall tenor of Wechsler's remarks that the Supreme Court should avoid articulating or enforcing prin
ciples of constitutional law unless they were appropriately "neutral"
- was of course inconsistent with the Legal Process school's most
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 {1959).
61. See, e.g., id. at 15 (asserting that legal reasoning "must be genuinely principled, rest
ing with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved").
62. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 286-91 {1973).
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fundamental assumptions about the nature of law as consisting of
values to be served, as well as rules and standards. These values
could, and in some instances should, lead to dramatic reconfigura
tions of the rights of others in the society.63 In fact, Sebok argues,
Wechsler, Bickel, and Bork were fundamentally motivated by a
skepticism about morality: since moral reasoning was an unreliable
basis for constitutional decisionmaking, they turned instead to vari
ous versions of "originalism," in the hopes that the supposedly reli
able facts about the intent of the Constitution's drafters could
legitimate constitutional interpretations in a way that moral princi
ples could not (pp. 191-92, 199-206). And finally, as Sebok demon
strates, Wechsler's criticisms of Brown were at odds with Sacks's
own writings, in which he discussed and praised the Supreme
Court's decision (pp. 122-23).
Nonetheless, the damage was done. And it was solidified by
subsequent developments. As Sebok views the story of constitu
tional law scholarship during the 1960s and 1970s, what Wechsler
begat was the later, increasingly more conservative, criticisms of
Supreme Court activism in the scholarship of first Alexander Bickel
and then Robert Bork. Their increasingly conservative stance
meant that, more and more, the Legal Process school was assumed
to be both conservative in its leanings and outdated in its views.
Finally, the conservative critics of the Supreme Court in tum begat
an opposing strand of constitutional law scholarship, that of David
Richards, Tom Grey and, most importantly, Ronald Dworkin, all of
whom Sebok summarizes under the heading of "fundamental
rights" theories (pp. 195-96, 217-22). As Sebok explains the dy
namic, the fundamental rights theorists were led to respond to the
moral skepticism of the Court's conservative critics (pp. 206-16).
The rights theorists were joined in their view that constitutional in
terpretation could meaningfully be founded on substantive moral
values. Although diverse in their particular arguments, the "funda
mental rights" theorists converged on a premise that the Court was
obligated in its constitutional decisions to advance certain basic val
ues like justice, fairness, or integrity. These writers were led by a
complex of reasons both to reject positivism and, since they associ
ated Hart and Sacks with Bickel and Bork, to scorn the Legal Pro
cess school in particular. And so, the cycle was repeated: the
positivism of Hart and Sacks was tarred with a conservative brush
and then ultimately criticized and rejected by those who sought to
repudiate the supposed conservativism.

63. See, e.g., TLP, supra note 14, at 93-94 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y.
1889)) and at 357 (discussing Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 1 Gray 263 (1854)).
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FnTING THE PIECES TOGETHER?
Sebok's reevaluation of Hart and Sacks's fall from grace in
American legal theory and his reassessment of their views are sub
stantial contributions to our understanding of American legal
theory. Similarly, his discussion of the dispute between incorpora
tionism and exclusivism and his emendation of Coleman's argument
are noteworthy, taken on their own. These arguments seem, how
ever, to be logically independent of one another: Hart and Sacks
were misread, and underappreciated, whether or not incorporation
ism is a better theory of the role of moral principles in the law, and
the adequacy of incorporationism does not seem to depend on our
preference for the Legal Process school's theory of adjudication.
What more does Sebok see in these topics that leads him to link
them together in this kind of sustained inquiry? His project some
how requires that these two arguments fit together so as to com
plete the argument about positivism's reemergence, fitter and more
sophisticated, from its various challenges. Unfortunately, what
remains unclear is the connection that Sebok sees between these
two facets of his argument. Nor is it clear that he succeeds in estab
lishing such a connection, whatever it may be.
For example, it is somehow important to his grander enterprise
that Sebok argue not only that Hart and Sacks's is a satisfactory and
insightful theory of adjudication, but further that they were truly
positivists in their thinking. As I see it, however, this more ambi
tious argument is unsuccessful.
To begin with, this construal of the Legal Process manuscript
goes against the grain. Sebok's argument minimizes just how paro
chial Hart and Sacks were in their argument. At the level of philos
ophy of law, the aim of any good theory is to explain the features of
law in whatever form we might encounter it. Accordingly, a satis
factory philosophical account of law must range over legal systems
in a variety of political contexts - monarchies and dictatorships as
well as democracies. It must also subsume legal systems of varying
structures and complexity - civil law as well as common law tradi
tions, together with socialist legal systems and primitive legal orders
where one authoritative person makes, interprets, and adjudicates
the law. The Legal Process attempts none of this universality. To
the contrary, Hart and Sacks examine only those legal systems, such
as our own, that come within the Anglo-American tradition. In
deed, to a very great extent, they are unconcerned with anything
about lawmaking and application other than adjudication, and even
that is mostly limited to judicial decisionmaking. Some sporadic ex
ceptions notwithstanding, their manuscript is principally the devel
opment of a theory of adjudication and mostly a theory of
adjudication for common law systems similar to ours.
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Secondly, while Sebok argues that The Legal Process conforms
to his positivistic tripod - separability thesis, command theory, and
sources thesis - this argument is unpersuasive.64 Consider, as one
example, his contention that Hart and Sacks embraced the separa
bility thesis. According to Sebok, this position is revealed in what
the manuscript calls "the principle of institutional settlement,"
which "requires that a decision which is the due result of duly estab
lished procedures be accepted whether it is right or wrong - at
least for the time being."65 The cornerstone of Sebok's argument is
that institutional settlement entails law's separability from morality,
for his statement of the principle's definition is immediately fol
lowed by the conclusion: "Hart and Sacks therefore recognized
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and
therefore embraced a central tenet of legal positivism, the separa
bility thesis" (p. 130).
But the separability thesis does not follow from the principle of
institutional settlement. Among other things, Sebok's argument
ignores an important issue about the scope of any purported con
nection between law and morality. One famous, if suspect, version
of natural law, · often but perhaps inaccurately attributed to Thomas
Aquinas, holds that "an unjust law is no law at all."66 This version
of natural law asserts a necessary connection between morality and
each law of the legal system. But it is difficult to find natural law
adherents who would argue, in any sustained way, that each law
must necessarily be moral or just. As an alternative, more contem
porary examples of natural law can be seen to argue that there is
some kind of connection between morality and the legal system,
taken as a whole (as was suggested by Lon Fuller) or between
64. Pp. 129-38, 159. In one other respect, as well, Sebek has shown a propensity to force
writers into one camp or another. In his review of the "fundamental rights" version of consti
tutional interpretation, he distinguishes among different strains of what he labels "epistemic"
natural law. Pp. 229-34. The point of the analysis is to capture the efforts of theorists like
David Richards and Ronald Dworkin who want to include in constitutional law substantive
moral values like justice or fairness, without thereby requiring that each judicial decision
serve only that value. Sebok argues on the basis of what he calls the "insatiability" of such
moral values, that each of these weaker versions of epistemic natural law collapses into some
thing more aggressive, and less plausible, than its adherents would hope. Pp. 234-56. It
seems to me, however, that this argument outstrips the data, because none of these versions
of "epistemic" natural law seems to me to be natural law at all. Consider, for example, what
he calls Almost Strong Epistemic Natural Law, which he defines as follows: "The existence
of a constitution entails the identification of justice as the source of supreme law." P. 230.
But this characterization, like his argument about the principle of institutional settlement,
lacks the required universality. This legal theory, whatever it may be called, makes claims
only about those legal systems that are built on a constitution, but offers no basis for ex
tending the argument to other kinds of legal systems. The theory is, therefore, not a natural
law theory. And the flaws of Almost Strong Epistemic Natural Law hold a fortiori for Not
Very Strong Epistemic Natural Law, p. 231, and for Weak Epistemic Natural Law, p. 233.

65. P. 130 (quoting TLP, supra note 14, at 109).
66. See, e.g., Brian Bix, ·Natural Law Theory, in A CoMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 17, 223, 226.
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morality and some essential process of law (as has been argued by
Ronald Dworkin). Conversely, if natural law can assert a logical
connection between various kinds of law and morality, then the
separability thesis's denial of any logical or conceptual connection
must reach all those possible connections: no necessary connection
between morality and law, at any level. The principle of institu
tional settlement, however, cannot by itself establish that there is no
connection between morality and the legal system.
A simple example can help here. Suppose the legislature duly
enacts, and the executive duly signs, a law discriminating against
persons with red hair, or those of Chaldean descent. Institutional
settlement requires that the law be "accepted whether it is right or
wrong - at least for the time being."67 But within our system, it is
clear that institutional settlement must coexist with our system of
checks and balances, and so the results of duly established legisla
tive and executive procedures can yield, after the appropriate fur
ther process, to decisions by the judiciary. Indeed, for the
"fundamental rights" theorists that Sebok discussed, it is proper
that the legislature's duly established procedures might be displaced
by, or be corrected to become, a morally more satisfying result in
accord with various fundamental precepts of justice or fairness or
dignity. More generally, in a system of law which has some alloca
tion of responsibilities comparable to our own sense of the separa
tion of powers, the principle of institutional settlement might be
appealing because one holds that the system as a whole secures
moral values, even though the actions of different institutions,
taken individually, might nonetheless be unjust. So, various forms
of natural law theories could be held consistently with the principle
of institutional settlement, and the principle thus has not been
shown to entail the separability thesis.
I should be clear about the nature of my disagreement with
Sebok's argument. I view the Legal Process manuscript as, on the
whole, more positivistic than not.68 And, I certainly join with
Sebok in rejecting those who interpret Hart and Sacks as commit
ted, in some deep way, to a natural law position: their parochialism
vitiates any imputation of a natural law view at least as much as it
does the contrary argument. My point is that the record does not
require either interpretation, and accordingly I prefer to leave Hart
and Sacks out of the traditional philosophical debates about the
nature of law.
But this leaves my first question: Why does Sebok feel the need
to construe Hart and Sacks as postivists? What would be lost from
67. TLP, supra note 14, at 109.
68. See Wellman, supra note 35, at 470 ("(1be Legal Process] manuscript . . . suggests a
positivistic orientation.").
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his thesis if the Legal Process school were left as only a theory of
adjudication and not a theory of the nature of law as well? The
answer is uncertain, but I can venture one hypothesis. I observed
earlier that positivism can be thought of as thin or thick and that
Coleman, following Hart, understood the philosophical position as
thin. Put differently, Coleman views positivism's philosophical
claim about the nature of law as independent from the particulars
of developing an adequate theory of adjudication. Sebok appears
to disagree; to use his own preferred terminology, he seems to want
to fatten up positivism into something more than just a theory of
law. To be sure, he does not profess great ambitions on this point
- he says only that he argues for a somewhat thicker version than
does Coleman.69 Two aspects of his enterprise, however, suggest
otherwise. First, he characterizes positivism's ambitions as larger
than just the development of a theory of the nature of law. Legal
positivism, he claims, "tries to understand law as a system of varia
bly constrained discretion" (p. 17). This goes beyond the thin
theory, linking the theory of law to a theory of adjudication. And,
second, if Sebok does not seek a thicker version of positivism, why
would he attempt to argue for the important connection between
positivism and the Legal Process school? He could be content,
instead, simply to appropriate their theory of adjudication as one
example of a theory which was consistent with incorporationist
positivism.
Indeed, the question is worth posing, whatever Sebok's own
aims might be. After all of Sebok's efforts, just how thin is positiv
ism, as he argues for it? If Hart and Sacks's theory of adjudication
is satisfactory, does that tell us that positivism is thicker than
Coleman might have thought? The answer on this score is still the
same as Coleman's: positivism appears to be thin, very thin.
Incorporationism affirms that a theory of adjudication like that of
Hart and Sacks - one that incorporates moral principles - is still
positivistic. But it does not require that every legal system must
treat adjudication along those lines. Hart and Sacks's parochialism,
as I see it, undermines any claim that their theory of adjudication is
universal. What's left, then, is two enterprises, not one: a thin
theory of the nature of law, and a rich and provocative theory of
adjudication.

69. See pp. 18-19 (disagreeing with the claim th;:tt positi\rism is only a "semantic" and not
also an "epistemic" theory of law).

